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LITIGATING AN EPIDEMIC: CALIFORNIA 
PLAINTIFFS IN THE NATIONAL OPIOID 
LITIGATION 
 Samantha T. Pannier*
Can litigation solve a public health epidemic? The opioid epidemic 
has cost California 24,885 lives, 1 $4.3 billion, and counting.2 As a result, 
over 500 California cities, counties,3 and sovereign Indian tribes4 are 
engaged in civil litigation against over twenty different opioid 
manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies for their role in creating 
and profiting from an epidemic of addiction. Cases brought by California 
plaintiffs account for about 20 percent of all ongoing opioid litigation 
nationally.5 This Note situates the claims of three California plaintiffs—
the State, the County of Mariposa, and the City of Los Angeles—within 
the context of the ongoing national opioid litigation, compares them to 
previous successful Big Tobacco litigation, and discusses what plaintiffs 
should do to retain both their ability to control claims and any potential 
settlement or judgment funds.  
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. My thanks to Dean Brietta Clark 
for her insight and guidance, Professor Adam Zimmerman for his procedural expertise, the Volume 
53 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Developments team, Volume 54 staffers, and any and all 
professors, teachers, supervising attorneys, and friends past and future who have ever taken a red 
pen to my work—thank you for helping me and my writing grow. 
 1. California Opioid Overdose Surveillance Dashboard, CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
https://discovery.cdph.ca.gov/CDIC/ODdash/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) [hereinafter California 
Opioid Dashboard]. Cumulative data were collected and analyzed by author, raw data are publicly 
available, and data analysis is available upon request. Corroborated by California: Opioid-Involved 
Deathsand Related Harms, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.drugabuse
.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-summaries-by-state/california-opioid-summary. 
 2. Thomas Hale & Sarah DiSalvo, The Opioid Epidemic: An Economic Overview in the State 
of California, CAL. STATE TREASURER’S OFF. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://medium.com/@catreasurer
/the-opioid-epidemic-an-economic-overview-in-the-state-of-california-ad7a5d4558d0. 
 3. Jose A. Del Real, Sick River: Can These California Tribes Beat Heroin and History?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/us/klamath-river-california-tribes-
heroin.html. 
 4. Id. 
 5. At the time of writing, California cities and counties alone accounted for 539 of 2,500 
local government claims consolidated in the Northern District of Ohio. See Frequently Asked 
Questions, IN RE: NAT’L PRESCRIPTION OPIATES LITIG., https://www.opioidsnegotiationclass.inf
o/Home/FAQ#faq9 (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) [hereinafter FAQ, IN RE: NAT’L PRESCRIPTION 
OPIATES LITIG.]. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION TO AN EPIDEMIC: HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
In an opioid overdose, the drug overwhelms the central nervous 
system.6 Specifically, it targets the part of the user’s brain responsible 
for breathing.7 Eventually, the respiratory system becomes so 
depressed that the user suffocates.8 On average, 128 Americans—six 
Californians—die this way every day.9 
In fall 2017, the opioid epidemic officially became a public health 
emergency.10 Unlike naturally occurring epidemic diseases, such as 
influenza or HIV/AIDS, the distinctive characteristic of the opioid 
crisis is its principal mode of transmission: human malfeasance.11 
Opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies (collectively 
“opioid defendants”) created a highly addictive product and presented 
it to the public as safe when they knew it was not.12 Drug manufacturer 
Purdue Pharma’s “blockbuster” opioid, OxyContin, is perhaps the 
most well-known of all name-brand and generic opioids.13 
 
 6. Opioid Overdose Basics: What Is an Overdose?, NAT’L HARM REDUCTION COAL., 
https://harmreduction.org/issues/overdose-prevention/overview/overdose-basics/what-is-an-
overdose/ (last modified Sept. 1, 2020). 
 7. ELIZABETH Y. SCHILLER ET AL., OPIOID OVERDOSE 7–8 (2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK470415/?report=reader#_NBK470415_pubdet_ (last 
updated Nov. 20, 2020). 
 8. Id. 
 9. California: Opioid-Involved Deaths and Related Harms, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE 
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-summaries-by-
state/california-opioid-summary (daily crude averages calculated by author using data from CDC 
WONDER, California n = 2,410/365 and United States n = 46,802/365). 
 10. Letter from Eric D. Hargan, Acting Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Hum. Servs. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opioid%20PHE%20Decla
ration-no-sig.pdf; see also 42 U.S.C. § 247(d) (2018). 
 11. See Harriet Ryan et al., ‘You Want a Description of Hell?’ Oxycontin’s 12-Hour Problem, 
L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/projects/oxycontin-part1/; Kim Christensen, 
Purdue Pharma Sought to Divert Online Readers from Critical L.A. Times Series on Opioid Crisis, 
Records Show, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/
2019-08-14/purdue-pharma-coverage-divert-opioid-crisis; U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SEC. & 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFS. COMM., FUELING AN EPIDEMIC 2 (2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&d
id=808171. 
 12. Ryan et al., supra note 11. 
 13. OxyContin is so ubiquitous that the terms “oxy” and “perky” frequent pop music lyrics 
extolling the drugs’ recreational opioid use. See, e.g., Oxy, GENIUS, https://genius.com/Future-oxy-
lyrics (last visited Oct. 4, 2020); Ben Beaumont-Thomas, The Death of Lil Peep: How the US 
Prescription Drug Epidemic Is Changing Hip-Hop, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2017, 12:45 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2017/nov/16/death-lil-peep-us-prescription-drugs-epidemic-
hip-hop-rapper. Oxycontin’s popularity is frequently described in the same terms as a successful 
film, a “blockbuster.” See German Lopez, Purdue Pharma, Maker of OxyContin, Files for 
Bankruptcy, VOX (Sept. 16, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/9/16/20868487/purdue-pharma-oxycontin-bankruptcy-opioid-epidemic. 
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OxyContin’s story is a useful example of how over the course of two 
decades opioids managed to reshape American life. 
Prior to OxyContin—and the wave of new opioids that 
followed—most pain medication was designed to be immediately 
released and absorbed into the body.14 Patients receive the whole dose 
of opioids all at once.15 As a result, pain is treated almost immediately, 
but the medication wears off quickly, and side effects are strong.16 
OxyContin’s innovation was its extended release formula, which 
supposedly released smaller amounts of the drug into the body slowly 
over a longer period of time.17 OxyContin’s extended release formula 
broadened the opioid consumer market from patients experiencing 
acute, intense pain to America’s fifty million chronic pain sufferers.18 
Purdue’s marketing materials to physicians and patients promised 
that OxyContin’s “delayed absorption” formula prevented users from 
dependence and abuse.19 Until 2001, the label on OxyContin’s box 
read: “Delayed absorption as provided by OxyContin tablets, is 
believed to reduce the abuse liability of a drug.”20 This statement was 
the keystone to Purdue’s aggressive and, as the plaintiffs allege, false 
and misleading marketing campaign directed at doctors and the public 
at large.21 
 
 14. Charles E. Argoff & Daniel I. Silvershein, A Comparison of Long- and Short-Acting 
Opioids for the Treatment of Chronic Noncancer Pain: Tailoring Therapy to Meet Patient Needs, 
84 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 602, 603 (2009). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Ryan et al., supra note 11. 
 18. James Dahlhamer et al., Prevalence of Chronic Pain and High-Impact Chronic Pain 
Among Adults—United States, 2016, 67 CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1001, 1002 (Sept. 14,2018), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/w
r/pdfs/mm6736a2-H.pdf; Argoff & Silvershein, supra note 14, at 604. 
 19. Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public 
Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 224 (2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/art
icles/PMC2622774/#bib49; Marilyn Bulloch, How Oxycodone Has Contributed to the Opioid 
Epidemic, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018, 5:19 PM), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/contrib
utor/marilyn-bulloch-pharmd-bcps/2018/08/how-oxycodone-has-contributed-to-the-opioid-
epidemic. 
 20. Caitlin Esch, How One Sentence Helped Set Off the Opioid Crisis, MARKETPLACE 
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.marketplace.org/2017/12/13/opioid/; Van Zee, supra note 19, at 224; 
Bulloch, supra note 19. 
 21. David Armstrong, Secret Trove Reveals Bold ‘Crusade’ to Make OxyContin a 
Blockbuster, STAT (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/22/abbott-oxycontin-
crusade/; Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family That Built an Empire of Pain, THE NEW YORKER 
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-
empire-of-pain. 
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Purdue’s claim about OxyContin’s lack of addictive properties 
rested on shaky scientific ground: a single Purdue-funded study prior 
to the drug’s launch in 1996.22 The statement remained on 
OxyContin’s label from the drug’s launch in 1996 until 2001 when the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) forced Purdue to replace it with 
a “Black Box Warning,” the strongest warning possible for a drug.23 
The warning includes recommended dosing restrictions, notices about 
the risk of abuse, diversion,24 and the risk of “fatal respiratory 
depression.”25 But by then, the epidemic was already in motion. One 
study found that “[f]rom 1997 to 2002, OxyContin prescriptions 
increased from 670,000 to 6.2 million.”26 At the height of opioid 
prescription-writing in 2002, Purdue made more than $1 billion on 
OxyContin alone.27 
For their part, distributors like McKesson and 
AmerisourceBergen corporations, which supply pharmacies, 
hospitals, and clinics with medical equipment including 
pharmaceuticals, are accused of neglecting to report suspicious orders 
 
 22. Robert F. Reder et al., Steady-State Bioavailability of Controlled-Release Oxycodone in 
Normal Subjects, 18 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 95, 95–105 (1996); Bulloch, supra note 19. 
 23. Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and 
Abuse, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/timeline-
selected-fda-activities-and-significant-events-addressing-opioid-misuse-and-abuse (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Opioid Misuse Timeline]; FDA Issues New Warnings on Painkiller 
OxyContin, WEBMD (July 26, 2001), https://www.webmd.com/pain-management/news/ 
20010726/fda-issues-new-warnings-on-painkiller-oxycontin#1; Sujata S. Jayawant & Rajesh 
Balkrishnan, The Controversy Surrounding OxyContin Abuse: Issues and Solutions, 1 
THERAPEUTICS & CLINICAL RISK MGMT. 77, 78, 80 (2005); Letter from John F. Naioti, Jr., Drug 
Utilization Rev. Program Manager, to Prescribers (Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.health.ny.gov/he
alth_care/medicaid/program/dur/communications/2010/08/oxycontin_letter_final.pdf [hereinafter 
Letter from John F. Naioti, Jr.]; Michelle Llamas, Black Box Warnings, DRUGWATCH, 
https://www.drugwatch.com/fda/black-box-warnings/ (last modified Apr. 13, 2020); Flyer, A 
Guide to Drug Safety Terms at FDA, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 2 (Nov. 2012), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/74382/download. 
 24. Diversion is “any activity whereby legitimately made controlled substances that 
are intended to be used for lawful purposes are sold or exchanged in the illegitimate drug market 
as illicit substances. Controlled substances are contained in Drug Schedules I–V and are regulated 
by DEA.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO CONTROL 
THE DIVERSION OF OPIOIDS 1 n.2 (2019), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2019/e1905.pdf. 
 25. Letter from John F. Naioti, Jr., supra note 23; Jayawant & Balkrishnan, supra note 23, at 
78. 
 26. Mark R. Jones et al., A Brief History of the Opioid Epidemic and Strategies for Pain 
Medicine, 7 PAIN & THERAPY 13, 16 (2018). 
 27. Armstrong, supra note 21. 
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to state and federal authorities, failing to prevent diversion, and 
flooding communities with readily accessible prescription opioids.28 
Likewise, pharmacies are also accused of diverting and filling 
millions of prescriptions that they directly profited from but put their 
patients at risk.29 Walgreens even gave their pharmacists bonuses for 
filling high numbers of opioid prescriptions.30 
Now, as the opioid crisis continues and worsens,31 state and local 
governments, labor unions, and even water districts are suing opioid 
manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies using a variety of claims 
and theories of liability to varying degrees of success.32 California is 
no stranger to the epidemic, nor its litigation. On average, six 
Californians die from an opioid-related overdose every day.33 
As of this Note, there are at least 539 active lawsuits between 
California government plaintiffs and opioid manufacturers, 
distributors, and pharmacies.34 In total, about 20 percent of all ongoing 
opioid cases are brought by California plaintiffs.35 Nationally, local 
government plaintiffs rather than states predominate.36 As competition 
for control of state law claims and any judgment or settlement money 
 
 28. Nathaniel Weixel, Oklahoma Sues Three Major Opioid Distributors, THE HILL (Jan. 13, 
2020, 5:42 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/478067-oklahoma-sues-three-major-opioid-
distributors; Complaint at 134–36, City of Los Angeles v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 18-op-45601-
DAP (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter City of Los Angeles Complaint]. 
 29. Complaint at 92–95, County of Mariposa v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 18-op-
45618-DAP (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter County of Mariposa Complaint]. 
 30. Jenn Abelson et al., At Height of Crisis, Walgreens Handled Nearly One in Five of the 
Most Addictive Opioids, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investig
ations/2019/11/07/height-crisis-walgreens-handled-nearly-one-five-most-addictive-
opioids/?arc404=true. 
 31. Maria LaMagna, More Evidence That the Opioid Epidemic Is Only Getting Worse, 
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 16, 2018, 10:34 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-much-
the-opioid-epidemic-costs-the-us-2017-10-27. 
 32. Andrew Harris et al., Justice for Opioid Communities Means Massive Payday for Their 
Lawyers, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-opioid-
lawsuits/; Colin Dwyer, Your Guide to the Massive (and Massively Complex) Opioid Litigation, 
NPR (Oct. 15, 2019, 9:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/10/15/761537367/ 
your-guide-to-the-massive-and-massively-complex-opioid-litigation. 
 33. California: Opioid-Involved Deaths and Related Harms, supra note 9. 
 34. Shayna Posses, Calif. Tribes Become Latest to Bring Opioid Crisis Suits, LAW360 
(Oct. 17, 2018, 6:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1093089/calif-tribes-become-latest-
to-bring-opioid-crisis-suits; see Home, IN RE: NAT’L PRESCRIPTION OPIATES LITIG., 
https://www.opioidsnegotiationclass.info/Home/FAQ#faq9 [hereinafter Entities of the Negotiation 
Class] (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) (click “Cities and Counties” hyperlink); Del Real, supra note 3. 
 35. See supra note 5; Dwyer, supra note 32. 
 36. See Morgan A. McCollum, Note, Local Government Plaintiffs and the Opioid Multi-
District Litigation, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 938, 942–43 (2019). 
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grows, tensions between cities, counties, and their state governments 
are rising.37 
The opioid litigation is about two things: control of claims and 
control of settlement or judgment money. California plaintiffs, 
especially local governments, have learned the lessons of previous 
public health litigation. By joining with other local governments 
across the state and country, California cities and counties have 
learned how to consolidate both their claims and their bargaining 
power.38 However, it remains to be seen whether California plaintiffs 
have learned the lessons of previous public health settlements. Many 
California government plaintiffs continue to receive payments from 
public health settlements, yet very few actually apply those payments 
to public health programs.39 
While litigation cannot solve the epidemic, it can provide the 
means to end it. First, litigation can provide accountability and show 
us how we got here. An open and public process like a trial can hold 
opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies accountable for 
creating and profiting from the epidemic, expose corporate 
malfeasance by making internal corporate documents public, and 
attempt to put a dollar value on the psychological, emotional, and 
economic toll the epidemic has taken on communities around the 
country. Second, litigation can provide the funds necessary for 
governments and opioid defendants to chart a course out of the 
epidemic. The increasing procedural complexity of the opioid 
litigation and the public and political attention may exert enough 
pressure on the parties that they will come to a global settlement 
agreement rather than continue litigation. Settlement or a judgment in 
 
 37. Andrew J. Tobias & Eric Heisig, Gov. Mike DeWine, Seeking to Ease Tensions in Opioid 
Litigation, Holds Talks at Mansion with AG Yost, Local Leaders, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 23, 
2019), https://www.cleveland.com/open/2019/10/gov-mike-dewine-seeking-to-ease-tensions-in-
opioid-litigation-holds-talks-at-mansion-with-ag-yost-local-leaders.html. 
 38. McCollum, supra note 36, at 947–48. 
 39. See A State-by-State Look at the 1998 Tobacco Settlement 21 Years Later, CAMPAIGN FOR 
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/us/statereport (last updated 
Jan. 16, 2020) [hereinafter State-by-State Tobacco Settlements 21 Years Later]; Micah L. Berman, 
Using Opioid Settlement Proceeds for Public Health: Lessons from the Tobacco Experience, 67 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1029, 1038 (2019); Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Payments 
Received by State, Counties, and Cities 1999–2020, State of Cal. Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Att’y 
Gen. 20, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/tobacco/settlements/tmsapc-1999-2019.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2020) [hereinafter Tobacco MSA Payments 1999–2020]; Actual Annual 
Tobacco Settlement Payments Received by the States, 1998–2020, Campaign for Tobacco-Free 
Kids, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0365.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
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favor of the plaintiffs can be used to fund long-term addiction 
treatment, prevention, and other public health programs that will, over 
time, abate the public health crisis. 
As the likelihood of settlement with the opioid defendants 
grows,40 how the State of California and its local governments choose 
to divide and spend these limited funds matters both to Californians 
and as a model to other states, cities, and counties. However, an 
effective use of such funds can only be achieved if California plaintiffs 
appreciate the lessons of previous public health litigation. The 
blueprint for such litigation and settlement exists. The Big Tobacco 
suits of the 1990s provide California plaintiffs a beginner’s guide to 
massive, complex public health litigation and settlement. Unlike the 
funds from the Big Tobacco litigation, California and its cities and 
counties should start planning now to protect and use settlement funds 
or judgment money to end the opioid epidemic. Just as in the Big 
Tobacco litigation, a memorandum of understanding between the state 
and local governments about the division of funds between different 
levels of government could be agreed upon before settlement with 
opioid defendants. California plaintiffs should also take action now to 
protect any settlement or judgment funds from non-public health 
expenditures through a statute, referendums and ballot initiatives, and 
public health mandates within the terms of any settlement agreement. 
Part II of this Note will describe the current state of the public 
health crisis and how the courts are managing the legal response. Part 
III will discuss previous public health litigation and settlement, and 
compare the claims, conflicts, and goals of three different California 
government plaintiffs as test cases: Mariposa County, the City of Los 
Angeles, and the State of California. Part IV concludes by suggesting 
methods for protecting public health funds generated by litigation or 
settlement from misappropriation by state and local legislative bodies. 
 
 40. See Jan Hoffman, Payout from a National Opioids Settlement Won’t Be as Big as Hoped, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/health/national-opioid-
settlement.html. 
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II.  FACTUAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH BACKGROUND 
A.  Public Health Emergency 
Epidemics are characterized by a sudden increase in disease 
occurrence in a population.41 In some communities, the opioid 
epidemic is so common it is essentially endemic.42 In 2018, 45 percent, 
or 2,410 of all fatal drug overdoses in California, involved opioids.43 
In the same year, 69 percent of all fatal drug overdoses nation-wide 
involved opioids.44 The epidemic is evolving so rapidly that 
comprehensive professional guidelines governing the prescription of 
opioids in order to prevent addiction were not released until 2016 and 
2017.45 
Opium-derived medications are essential to the modern practice 
of medicine and have been since the nineteenth century.46 Despite 
their usefulness and in some cases medical necessity, opioids’ 
addictive qualities have been known since their discovery, wreaked 
havoc on communities, and caused wars.47 
 
 41. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PRINCIPLES OF EPIDEMIOLOGY IN PUBLIC 
HEALTH PRACTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY AND BIOSTATISTICS 1–72 
(3rd ed. 2012), https://www.cdc.gov/csels/dsepd/ss1978/Lesson1/Section11.html#_ref47 (stating 
“[m]ore specifically, an epidemic may result from: [1] a recent increase in amount or virulence of 
the agent, [2] [t]he recent introduction of the agent into a setting where it has not been before, [3] 
[a]n enhanced mode of transmission so that more susceptible persons are exposed, [4] [a] change 
in the susceptibility of the host response to the agent, and/or [5] [f]actors that increase host exposure 
or involve introduction through new portals of entry”). 
 42. See Robin Young, In Township Ravaged by Opioids, Educators Create Program to Help 
Kids Cope, WBUR (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2019/09/25/minford-ohio-
opioids-schools; Nicole Gastala, Denial: The Greatest Barrier to the Opioid Epidemic, 15 ANNALS 
FAM. MED. 372, 372–74 (2017). 
 43. California: Opioid-Involved Deaths and Related Harms, supra note 9 (age-adjusted rate 
of 5.8 per 100,000); Drug Overdose Deaths, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/DRUGOVERDOSE/DATA/STATEDEATHS.HTML (last reviewed Mar. 1
9, 2020) (age-adjusted rate of 12.8 per 100,000). 
 44. Drug Overdose Deaths, supra note 43 (n = 46,802/67,367). 
 45. See Laxmaiah Manchikanti et al., Responsible, Safe, and Effective Prescription of Opioids 
for Chronic Non-Cancer Pain: American Society of Interventional Pain Physicians (ASIPP) 
Guidelines, 20 PAIN PHYSICIAN 3, S45–S63 (2017); Michael J. Brownstein, A Brief History of 
Opiates, Opioid Peptides, and Opioid Receptors, 90 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 5391, 5391 
(1993). See generally Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic 
Pain—United States, 2016, 315 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1624, 1624 (2016). 
 46. Brownstein, supra note 45, at 5391; Ramtin Arablouei & Rund Abdelfatah, A History of 
Opioids in America, NPR (Apr. 4, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/04/709767408/a-
history-of-opioids-in-america. 
 47. Kenneth Pletcher, Opium Wars, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Opium-Wars (last visited Dec. 21, 2020); Rebecca Delfino, Just 
What the Doctor Ordered: A New Federal Statute to Criminalize Physicians for Overprescribing 
Opioids, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2021), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3535943. 
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The origins of the present crisis are now relatively well-
understood.48 Initially, opioids were only prescribed for acute cancer-
related or short-term high-intensity pain relief.49 In the 1990s, 
prescriptions of hydrocodone and oxycodone for ordinary pain 
increased.50 After the development of extended release opioids, like 
OxyContin, manufacturers’ marketing strategies encouraged doctors 
to expand the market and prescribe the drug for a wider variety of 
maladies from run-of-the-mill arthritis to sports injuries.51 This 
behavior occurred at the same time physicians began to think of pain 
as “the fifth vital sign” alongside basic signs of life like heart rate and 
blood pressure.52 However, around 2012, prescriptions decreased as 
governments and prescribers recognized the drug’s addictive 
qualities.53 As a result, many new addicts found their prescriptions cut 
off, and they needed to feed their addiction through other means. 
Heroin use, which was at its lowest point in years prior to the opioid 
epidemic, spiked.54 The market demand for heroin and synthetic 
opioids increased markedly.55 Synthetic opioids (drugs like fentanyl, 
fentanyl analogs, and tramadol) are chemically manufactured, often 
illicitly in countries like China, and can be ordered online for delivery 
by mail.56 They are often much stronger than their licit FDA-regulated 
 
 48. See Jones et al., supra note 26, at 13–21; Lindsy Liu et al., History of the Opioid Epidemic: 
How Did We Get Here?, NAT’L CAP. POISON CTR., https://www.poison.org/articles/opioid-
epidemic-history-and-prescribing-patterns-182 (last visited Oct. 4, 2020); THE NAT’L ACADS. OF 
SCIS. ENG’G MED., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND 
INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 2–3 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 
2017) [hereinafter PAIN MANAGEMENT]. 
 49. Argoff & Silvershein, supra note 14, at 602–03. 
 50. Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health 
Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 562 (2015), 
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122957. 
 51. Id. at 562–63; Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last reviewed Mar. 19, 
2020) (Brand names for these drugs include but are not limited to, Vicodin and OxyContin, and the 
names have even found their way into pop culture); PAIN MANAGEMENT, supra note 48, at 25–26. 
 52. Jones et al., supra note 26, at 15. 
 53. Id.; Opioid Misuse Timeline, supra note 23. 
 54. Drug Overdose Deaths, supra note 43; Kolodny et al., supra note 50, at 560–62; U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., DEA-DCT-DIR-007-20, 2019 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT 
ASSESSMENT 9–20 (2019), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/2019-NDTA-final-01-
14-2020_Low_Web-DIR-007-20_2019.pdf; Theodore J. Cicero et al., The Changing Face of 
Heroin Use in the United States: A Retrospective Analysis of Past 50 Years, 71 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
PSYCHIATRY 821, 823 (2014). 
 55. Cicero et al., supra note 54, at 825. 
 56. Steven Lee Myers, China Cracks Down on Fentanyl. But Is It Enough to End the U.S. 
Epidemic?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/01/world/asia/china-
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equivalents and even street-bought heroin.57 Due to the strength of 
synthetics and their widespread availability, overdoses have spiked.58 
 
Fig. 1 Opioid-related Deaths in California, 2006–2018 
Despite increased visibility through public health campaigns, 
government efforts, and journalistic scrutiny, California’s crisis is not 
actually getting better, it is getting worse. The age-adjusted rate of 
drug overdose deaths involving synthetic opioids increased between 
2016 and 2017 by forty-five percent.59 In response, the state launched 
public health initiatives and passed legislation to provide access to 
 
fentanyl-crackdown.html; Scott Pelley, Deadly Fentanyl Bought Online from China Being Shipped 
Through the Mail, CBS NEWS  (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/deadly-fentanyl-
bought-online-from-china-being-shipped-through-the-mail-60-minutes-2019-09-15/; Holly 
Hedegaard et al., Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States, 1999–2017, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db329.htm (last 
reviewed Nov. 29, 2018). 
 57. See infra note 59 and accompanying text; Drug Overdose Deaths, supra note 43; Synthetic 
Opioid Overdose Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/dru
goverdose/data/fentanyl.html (last reviewed Mar. 19, 2020). 
 58. See infra note 59 and accompanying text; Drug Overdose Deaths, supra note 43. 
 59. From 6.2 deaths to 9.0 per 100,000 persons. Hedegaard et al., supra note 56; Data 
Overview, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/dat
a/ (last reviewed Dec. 7, 2020). 
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addiction treatment, education, data sharing, and monitoring.60 
Another strategy has also emerged: litigation. 
B.  The Opioid Litigation So Far 
While current civil suits have gotten the most attention, opioid 
litigation has been ongoing since the millennium. The first wave of 
opioid litigation crested in the mid-2000s.61 It centered on 
manufacturers and over-prescribing doctors.62 Among other theories, 
these early suits alleged products liability, fraud, negligence, and 
breach of implied warranties.63 In 2007, three Purdue executives 
pleaded guilty to federal misbranding charges, and the company paid 
over $600 million to the Justice Department in settlement to close the 
investigation.64 In 2014, California’s Santa Clara and Orange Counties 
sued seven manufacturers for false advertising65 and successfully 
settled with one, while the rest of the case was stayed pending FDA 
determinations.66 Unfortunately, these early lawsuits and settlements 
did not stem the crisis nor changed defendants’ behavior.67 
Manufacturers’ sales teams continued aggressively marketing even to 
the point of bribing doctors in exchange for prescriptions.68 
 
 60. Sammy Caiola, Here Are California’s New Laws to Address the State’s Opioid Crisis, 
CAPRADIO (Jan. 16, 2019), http://www.capradio.org/articles/2019/01/16/here-are-californias-new-
laws-to-address-the-states-opioid-crisis/. 
 61. See In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1388, 1388 (J.P.M.L. 2004). 
 62. Id. at 1389. 
 63. Abbe R. Gluck et al., Civil Litigation and the Opioid Epidemic: The Role of Courts in a 
National Health Crisis 4 (Mar. 6, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=313
5410 (research paper). 
 64. Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html. 
 65. People v. Purdue Pharma, No. 201400725287, 2015 WL 5123273, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 27, 2015); California v. Purdue Pharma, No. SACV 14-1080-JLS (DFMx), 2014 WL 
6065907, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014). 
 66. John Kennedy, Teva to Pay $1.6M to Resolve Calif. Counties’ Opioid Suit, LAW360 
(May 25, 2017, 6:42 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/928559/teva-to-pay-1-6m-to-resolve-
calif-counties-opioid-suit. 
 67. See Sam Stanton, Feds Target McKesson Plant in West Sacramento Over ‘Suspicious’ 
Opioid Sales, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 2, 2019, 12:26 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/busin
ess/article233449717.html; Abelson et al., supra note 30; Mark Morales, Former Purdue Pharma 
President Called Addicted People ‘Victimizers’ in Emails, CNN (May 8, 2019, 6:04 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/health/sackler-purdue-opioid-emails/index.html; David 
Armstrong, Inside Purdue Pharma’s Media Playbook: How It Planted the Opioid “Anti-Story”, 
PROPUBLICA (Nov. 19, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-purdue-
pharma-media-playbook-how-it-planted-the-opioid-anti-story. 
 68. Andrew Joseph, ‘A Blizzard of Prescriptions’: Documents Reveal New Details About 
Purdue’s Marketing of OxyContin, STAT (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/01/15/
massachusetts-purdue-lawsuit-new-details/; Gabrielle Emanuel, Pharmaceutical Executives Face 
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The second wave of litigation, and the focus of this Note, consists 
of civil litigation initiated by government plaintiffs like cities, 
counties, and states, and targets the profit-making behavior that drove 
the epidemic. Governments seek injunctive relief to abate the crisis 
and damages for the cost of paying for the opioid crisis on a large scale 
including the cost of adapting and retrofitting hospitals, jails, police 
forces, and medical examiners’ services and facilities to cope with and 
combat the epidemic.69 Defendants fall into three categories: (1) 
manufacturers that developed and aggressively marketed opioids; (2) 
distributors that sent large quantities of the opioids to pharmacies, 
hospitals, and clinics; and (3) commercial pharmacies that filled and 
refilled prescriptions for addicts, all the while billing their insurance if 
they had it, and leaving the state to pick up the cost if consumers were 
uninsured.70 
1.  The National Picture: the Multidistrict Litigation, the Negotiation 
Class, and the States 
a.  The Multidistrict Litigation 
The opioid plaintiffs are a massive and diverse group. They 
consist of all manner of local governments, Indian tribes, labor unions, 
and even fire departments, and their cases are scattered among courts 
all over the country.71 The two groups with the most negotiation 
leverage are the focus of this Note: local governments (cities and 
counties) and states. 
Procedurally, the opioid litigation presents huge challenges to the 
judicial system. Nationally, there are more than 1,900 active cases 
involving local governments and states.72 The majority of these cases 
 
Prison Time in Case Linked to Opioid Crisis, NPR (Jan. 13, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2020/01/13/795200200/pharmaceutical-executives-face-prison-time-in-case-linked-to-opioid-
crisis. See generally Delfino, supra note 47 (discussing criminal charges against opioid 
prescribers). 
 69. County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 248–51. 
 70. See Jan Hoffman et al., 3,271 Pill Bottles, a Town of 2,831: Court Filings Say 
Corporations Fed Opioid Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
07/19/health/opioids-trial-addiction-drugstores.html. 
 71. McCollum, supra note 36, at 968–70; see also Gluck et al., supra note 63, at 17 (“It is 
unusual that the transferring panel was willing to group so many different kinds of defendants into 
the single MDL. . . . The transferring court, however, seemed to prefer a comprehensive action to 
get at a comprehensive solution.”). 
 72. Jan Hoffman, Groundwork Is Laid for Opioids Settlement That Would Touch Every 
Corner of U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/health/opioids-
lawsuit-settlement.html. 
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have been consolidated through a process called multidistrict 
litigation.73 
Multidistrict litigation, commonly known as an MDL, is a 
procedural tool created by Congress in 1968 to promote judicial 
efficiency.74 As litigation became increasingly complicated in the 
mid-twentieth century, MDL proceedings were created to centralize 
and consolidate discovery and pre-trial motions.75 When multiple 
similar civil claims have been filed in different federal district courts, 
a panel of federal judges called the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation (JPML) can transfer civil actions with similar questions of 
fact to a single district court that it assigns to hear consolidated pretrial 
proceedings.76 The parties to the litigation need not consent in order 
for their case to be transferred and in fact are frequently opposed to 
transfer.77 
Essentially, MDL transferee courts preside over everything but 
the trial itself.78 When an individual case is ready for trial, it is 
remanded back to the original court in which it was filed.79 MDLs 
mitigate the risk of inconsistent rulings between different courts on 
similar pre-trial issues and save parties time and costs during 
discovery.80 Typical MDL cases include employment practices, 
securities fraud, and quintessentially, medical device, drug, and 
products liability claims.81 
The vast majority of cases against opioid defendants have been 
consolidated by the JPML in the Northern District of Ohio before 
Judge Dan A. Polster.82 Five hundred thirty-nine California counties 
and cities and at least three sovereign California Indian tribes have 
 
 73. Id.; Transfer Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 2084, at 3–4 (J.P.M.L. 
Dec. 5, 2017) [hereinafter JPML Transfer Order]. 
 74. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018). 
 75. Overview of Panel, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., 
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/overview-panel-0 (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 76. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(h); see, e.g., Motion to Remand at 3–4, South Carolina v. McKesson 
Corp., No. 3:19-cv-02783-BHH (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2019), ECF No. 7. 
 78. Kathleen Michon, Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) for Drug Lawsuits and Other Cases, 
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/multidistrict-litigation-mdl-drug-lawsuits-
32952.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 79. Id. 
 80. JPML Transfer Order, supra note 73, at 3–4; Overview of Panel, supra note 75. 
 81. Michon, supra note 78. 
 82. JPML Transfer Order, supra note 73, at 4. 
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pending actions in the Opioid MDL court.83 In order to avoid 
consolidation in the Opioid MDL, most states, including California, 
have purposefully kept their cases in state court by only alleging state 
law claims.84 Of the test cases discussed in this Note, Mariposa County 
and the City of Los Angeles are consolidated in the Opioid MDL, and 
California is pursuing its claims alone in California state courts.85 All 
three cases were filed after the creation of the Opioid MDL in 2017, 
and both Mariposa and Los Angeles included federal claims in their 
original pleadings likely knowing that they would be immediately 
transferred to the Opioid MDL court.86 
In addition to being a tool for aggregation and faster resolution of 
pre-trial issues, MDLs frequently produce broadly binding 
settlements.87 To that end, it is clear that the goal of Judge Polster’s 
court and the Opioid MDL proceedings is settlement. At an early 
hearing on the matter, Judge Polster said, “my objective is to do 
something meaningful to abate this crisis. . . . [W]e don’t need a lot of 
briefs and we don’t need trials. . . . [N]one of those are going to solve 
what we’ve got.”88 MDLs attempt to achieve “global peace” or a 
settlement that uses claim preclusion to close all present and future 
litigation between the parties.89 
Though the Opioid MDL has been ongoing since 2017, a global 
settlement has still not been reached. Judge Polster has tried many 
tactics to encourage settlement.90 Some of them, like the negotiation 
 
 83. Posses, supra note 34; Del Real, supra note 3; Entities of the Negotiation Class, supra 
note 34. 
 84. Dwyer, supra note 32. See generally Complaint at 50–53, People v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 
No. 19STCV19045 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 3, 2019) [hereinafter State of California Complaint]. 
 85. See State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 1; City of Los Angeles Complaint, 
supra note 28, at 1; County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 1. 
 86. City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28, at 1; County of Mariposa Complaint, supra 
note 29, at 1. 
 87. See Guide, Ten Steps to Better Case Management: A Guide for Multidistrict Litigation 
Transferee Judges, U.S.  Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig. & Fed. Jud. Ctr. 9 (2014), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Ten-Steps-MDL-Judges-2D.pdf; McCollum, supra 
note 36, at 949–53; Adam S. Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 
2277–79 (2017). 
 88. Gluck et al., supra note 63, at 17. 
 89. McCollum, supra note 36, at 942. 
 90. See Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Schedules 2019 Trial in Opioid Litigation, REUTERS 
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://in.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigation-idINKBN1HI3EI. 
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class described below, are novel and being used for the first time 
ever.91 Others, like bellwether trials, are frequently used in MDLs.92 
b.  City and County of San Francisco bellwether 
Alternatively referred to as “test cases,” bellwethers are 
individual trials that test how different claims and defenses will fair at 
trial.93 The goal of a bellwether is to produce reliable information 
about how similar cases centralized in the same MDL proceeding are 
likely to play out so that those remaining parties in the MDL may 
decide if they wish to continue to their own trials or settle.94 After an 
initial set of bellwethers settled on the eve of trial in October 2019,95 
the court remanded three additional bellwethers to their original 
transferor district courts, to be tried simultaneously.96 City of Chicago 
v. Purdue Pharma L.P. will address claims against manufacturer 
defendants.97 Cherokee Nation v. McKesson Corp. is aimed at 
resolving the unique issues in cases brought by sovereign Indian 
tribes.98 City and County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P. 
names both manufacturers and distributors as defendants and is almost 
done with the discovery phase.99 
With California cities, counties, and sovereign tribes counting for 
over one-fifth of all plaintiffs in the Opioid MDL, City of San 
Francisco could be the most informative bellwether for all California 
plaintiffs. 
 
 91. Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 
No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP, at 2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter N.D. Ohio Memorandum 
Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class]. 
 92. Zimmerman, supra note 87, at 2276–77. Though two bellwether trials were initially 
scheduled for October 2019, they settled on the eve of trial. 
 93. Raymond, supra note 90. 
 94. Guide, Bellwether Trials in MDL Proceedings: A Guide for Transferee Judges, Melissa J. 
Whitney, Fed. Jud. Ctr. & U.S.  Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig. 3–4 (2019), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/19/Bellwether%20Trials%20in%20MDL%20Pro
ceedings.pdf. 
 95. The parties settled for about $300 million. Sara Randazzo & Patrick Fitzgerald, Novel Plan 
Aims to Settle Opioid Suits, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2019, 5:33 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/drugmakers-look-to-use-purdue-pharmas-bankruptcy-to-
settle-opioid-suits-11569877871; Dwyer, supra note 32. 
 96. Suggestions of Remand, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP, 
at 1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/sites/ohnd/files/2941.pdf. 
 97. Id. at 6. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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San Francisco alleges public nuisance, unfair competition, false 
advertising, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) violation, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and 
fraudulent concealment against Purdue Pharma, individual members 
of the Purdue family, the Purdue Family Trust, and several other 
manufacturers and distributors.100 San Francisco does not make claims 
against any pharmacies.101 San Francisco seeks costs, attorney’s fees, 
civil penalties, restitution, disgorgement of unjust enrichment, 
exemplary damages, punitive damages, and treble damages under 
RICO.102 All of the test cases examined in this Note share multiple 
claims with City of San Francisco. It will also be any California 
plaintiff’s first opportunity to litigate any issues of home rule, or which 
government entities “own” which claims when local governments and 
the state both seek to make the same claim, on behalf of the same 
citizens, on the same facts. In this case, California’s public nuisance 
statute is claimed by all plaintiffs.103 While the results of City of San 
Francisco will not be binding on other California plaintiffs, it should 
give an accurate picture of how similar claims are likely to play out in 
their own trials and may even promote settlement. As Table 1 
demonstrates, many California plaintiffs share similar claims.
 
 100. Complaint at 1–2, City and County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 3:18-cv-
7591 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2018), ECF No. 1. 
 101. Id. (a complaint that does not have claims against pharmacies). 
 102. Id. at 158–59. 
 103. Id. at 1. 
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City of Los 
Angeles California 
Statutory Public 
Nuisance X X X X 
RICO X X X  
Negligence X  X  
Unjust 
Enrichment  X 
  
Negligent 
Misrepresentation X X X 
 
Fraud  X   
Fraudulent 





(Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code 
§ 17500) 
X X  X 
Unfair 
Competition Law 
(Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code 
§ 17200) 
X   X 
* X indicates that the plaintiff makes this claim in its complaint. 
c.  Negotiation class 
The Opioid MDL created a new tool in class action practice: the 
negotiation class.104 In a typical class action, putative class members 
 
 104. N.D. Ohio Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 91, at 3; see 
also Deborah Hensler, Opioid Negotiation Class May Be Organic Procedure Evolution, LAW360 
(Sept. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1204097/opioid-negotiation-class-
may-be-organic-procedure-evolution (discussing Judge Polster being the first judge to adopt the 
negotiation class); Order Certifying Review of Negotiation Class, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate 
Litig., No. 19-0306, at 1–2 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 2019) [hereinafter 6th Cir. Order Certifying Review 
of Negotiation Class]. Note, the negotiation class is currently under review with the Sixth Circuit. 
See generally Appeals Court Grants Review of Opioid ‘Negotiation’ Class Opposed by 
Delaware, Others, DEL. L. 
WKLY. (Nov. 8, 2019), https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/3b15ecd3-f77c-43c4-a1d6-
d4a01c46daee/?context=1530671. 
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may opt in or out of a settlement after terms are reached.105 However, 
in the negotiation class, plaintiffs opt in or out of the class before 
settlement negotiations begin. The mechanism provides defendants 
with more security during negotiations knowing that individual class 
members will not opt out later if they do not like the terms. A final 
settlement will require approval by 75 percent of the class members in 
five different votes: 75 percent each by allocation, by population, by 
number, by plaintiffs who have begun litigating, and by plaintiffs who 
have not begun litigating, plus “approval from six separate 
supermajority vote counts, reflecting different slices of the class,”106 
and the court will still have to approve the settlement under Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(e) and 23(h).107 
The negotiation class is comprised of all county and city 
governments involved in the MDL.108 It explicitly excludes Native 
American tribal governments and payors, and implicitly excludes 
states.109 The negotiation class preserves the rights of class members 
to pursue their own claims in other fora outside of the MDL until a 
settlement is approved.110 The negotiation class will remain active for 
five years—in other words, the parties will have until 2024 to come to 
terms.111 
As the negotiation class is an expansion of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, the Sixth Circuit has granted interlocutory review of 
Judge Polster’s order certifying the class.112 The novel nature of the 
negotiation class potentially puts any settlements reached between 
defendants and the class at risk. If the Sixth Circuit finds the 
negotiation class an impermissible expansion of Rule 23, then any 
settlements reached may be unraveled. A number of plaintiffs, 
 
 105. The Special Master overseeing the Opioid MDL settlement negotiations, Professor Francis 
McGovern along with Professor William B. Rubenstein pioneered the idea of creating a 
“Negotiation Class.” Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class: A 
Cooperative Approach to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3403834.#. 
 106. N.D. Ohio Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class, supra note 91, at 3. 
 107. See FAQ, IN RE: NAT’L PRESCRIPTION OPIATES LITIG., supra note 5 (see answer to 
question 19). 
 108. Other political subdivisions are also included, “[a]ll counties, parishes, and boroughs 
(collectively, ‘counties’); and all incorporated places, including without limitation cities, towns, 
townships, villages, and municipalities (collectively, ‘cities’).” Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 6th Cir. Order Certifying Review of Negotiation Class, supra note 104, at 2. 
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defendants, and amici argued against the negotiation class before the 
Sixth Circuit.113 In addition, twenty-six state attorney generals led by 
Texas’ Ken Paxton and California’s Xavier Becerra oppose the 
creation of the negotiation class, stating, “Plaintiffs’ novel and 
untested approach . . . . [,] the approval of a novel ‘[N]egotiation 
[C]lass’  at this stage[,] will invite legal challenges to any eventual 
settlement, adding uncertainty and making it more difficult for the 
parties to a achieve a global resolution.”114 
The negotiation class creates a block of plaintiffs (some cities and 
counties are not even members, yet would still be bound by a global 
settlement agreement) with the greatest negotiation leverage. This 
makes other plaintiffs, especially state attorneys general who are used 
to calling their own shots, uncomfortable. These are not the only 
points of contention between local and state government plaintiffs. 
d.  Disagreements between local and state plaintiffs 
In recent settlement negotiations, fractures developed between 
states and local governments.115 The Attorneys General, politically 
elected or appointed, may have the political incentive and the financial 
resources of their state’s respective departments of justice to be 
flexible and hold out for settlement offers in a way that many local 
governments cannot. In response to a settlement offer from Purdue, 
the Pennsylvania Attorney General called the company’s owners, the 
Sackler family, “‘sanctimonious billionaires’ with ‘blood on their 
hands.’”116 Accordingly, cities and counties appear wary of deferring 
to attorneys general. Another problem is the fact that local and state 
governments seek to assert the same claims, under the same statutes, 
on the same facts, and may not both be able to recover. Adding to the 
confusion is each state’s unique case law regarding home rule and 
 
 113. Petition for Permission to Appeal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) at 1, 
In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 19-305 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 2019); Joint Petition for 
Permission to Appeal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription 
Opiate Litig., No. 19-305 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 2019), ECF No. 1-2. 
 114. Letter, Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Certification of Rule 23(b)(3) 
Cities/Counties Negotiation Class, In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, MDL No. 2804, 
from Ken Paxton, State of Tex., Off. of Att’y Gen., Xavier Becerra, State of Cal., Off of Att’y Gen., 
to Judge Polster (June 24, 2019). 
 115. Alaina Lancaster, Why NJ Didn’t Join the Settlement with Purdue Pharma, LAW.COM 
(Sept. 12, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2019/09/12/why-cities-and-
counties-settled-with-purdue-while-some-states-wouldnt-touch-it-399-31661/. 
 116. Id. 
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ambiguous statutory language as to whether local governments may 
bring claims on behalf of all people in the state. When Ohio attempted 
to pass legislation consolidating the state’s one hundred or so local 
government cases under the Attorney General’s office, Akron mayor 
Dan Horrigan wrote, “[t]o suggest, at the 11th hour, that the state 
should control and keep the hard-fought compensation our community 
and first responders deserve is offensive . . . . It’s clear who is grasping 
for power (and money) in this situation.”117 
e.  Purdue’s bankruptcy: defendants seek to control settlement 
Plaintiffs are not the only ones attempting to control settlement 
on their own terms.118 Purdue Pharmaceuticals, the most frequently 
named and maligned defendant, recently entered bankruptcy 
proceedings in the Southern District of New York.119 Because 
Purdue’s assets will be severely restricted, bankruptcy has 
significantly increased Purdue’s leverage in settlement negotiations. 
Further complicating settlement negotiations is the uncertain 
valuation of Purdue’s assets and plaintiffs’ choice to name or not name 
the Sackler family individually as defendants in order to access their 
personal assets in trial or settlement.120 Bankruptcy court documents 
estimate that the Sackler family personally profited $13 billion from 
Purdue, and before declaring bankruptcy, transferred $1 billion into 
offshore personal accounts.121 
The early outlines of a settlement agreement between Purdue and 
twenty-nine U.S. territories and states began to take shape in 2019. 
The proposed settlement would transfer all of Purdue’s assets into a 
trust and restructure the business into a new company that is 
 
 117. Robin Goist, Summit County Executive, Akron Mayor Condemn Proposed State Takeover 
of Lawsuits Against Opioid Makers, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.cleveland.co
m/open/2019/08/summit-county-executive-akron-mayor-condemn-proposed-state-takeover-of-
lawsuits-against-opioid-makers.html. 
 118. See McCollum, supra note 36, at 953–54, 969–71. 
 119. See Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy at 5, No. 19-23649-rdd 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y Sept. 15, 2019). 
 120. Jan Hoffman & Mary Williams Walsh, Purdue Pharma, Maker of OxyContin, Files for 
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/health/purdue-
pharma-bankruptcy-opioids-settlement.html (updated Sept. 17, 2019). 
 121. Christopher Rowland, Sackler Family Transferred $1.36 Billion in Purdue Pharma 
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permanently enjoined from marketing opioids.122 The new company 
would also donate overdose reversal and addiction treatment 
medications to communities in need.123 Moreover, the Sackler family 
would relinquish ownership of Purdue and contribute at least $3 
billion of their own money to the $10 to $12 billion settlement.124 The 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York will 
administer the settlement during Purdue’s Chapter 11 proceedings. 
Most compelling of all, five other manufacturer defendants Endo 
International, Johnson & Johnson, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, 
Allergan, and Mallinckrodt seek to join Purdue’s bankruptcy 
proceedings through a global settlement agreement.125 The other 
drugmakers would contribute to the settlement’s trust in exchange for 
settlement and a so-called third-party release of claims—a form of 
settlement only available in some jurisdictions like New York.126 
Besides carrying heavy debts as a result of litigation, defendants 
like Purdue are also facing challenges from their litigation insurers.127 
As local, state, and federal governments begin to receive judgments 
against manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars, defendants’ litigation insurers are questioning 
whether their coverage extends to cover a public health crisis.128 
Health insurance companies are also suing manufacturers for 
insurance fraud.129 For example, Athena is suing bankrupt opioid 
manufacturer Insys, claiming “that the rapid increase in Insys’s sales 
was due to a two-pronged scheme in which Insys encouraged 
physicians to overprescribe . . . and defrauded insurers into providing 
coverage for the off-label prescriptions.”130 
Not all states are buying into Purdue’s bankruptcy-driven 
settlement offer. Some attorneys general draw issue with the fact that 
 
 122. Id.; Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 120. 
 123. Rowland, supra note 121; Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 120. 
 124. Hoffman & Walsh, supra note 120. 
 125. Randazzo & Fitzgerald, supra note 95. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Raymond Tittmann et al., 5 Insurance Coverage Questions Raised by Opioid Litigation, 
LAW360 (Aug. 7, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1185428/5-insurance-
coverage-questions-raised-by-opioid-litigation; Michael Levesque et al., Research Announcement: 
Moody’s—More Opioid Settlements Likely in 2020, with Mainly Negative Credit Impact for 
Defendants, MOODY’S (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-More-opioid-
settlements-likely-in-2020-with-mainly-negative--PBC_1218393. 
 128. Tittmann et al., supra note 127. 
 129. See Aetna Inc. v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 3d 541, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
 130. Id. at 548. 
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the Sackler family will not personally be forced to disgorge any of 
their profits.131 The Ad Hoc Group of Non-Consenting States is a 
group opposed to a bankruptcy settlement and includes California, 
twenty-three other states, and D.C.132 While state court cases against 
Purdue are stayed during Purdue’s bankruptcy, until a majority of 
states with active suits consent, there will be no settlement.133 
2.  California Plaintiffs: A Fight on Many Fronts 
This Note compares the claims lodged by Mariposa County in 
northern California, the City of Los Angeles, and the State of 
California. Local governments pleaded broadly and are pursuing 
claims in federal court in the MDL, where the state’s case is narrowly 
pleaded against a single manufacturer and remains in state superior 
court. 
a.  Mariposa County 
Mariposa County (“Mariposa” or “the County”) is home to just 
under 18,000 Californians,134 portions of Yosemite National Park, and 
14,441 active prescriptions for opioids—roughly 0.85 per resident.135 
Mariposa is a named member of the Opioid MDL negotiation class 
and has also joined other local plaintiffs in the California Opioid 
Consortium, a group mostly made up of other California local 
governments represented by the same plaintiff’s firm.136 Mariposa 
 
 131. Nathaniel Weixel, Holdouts Vow to Challenge Purdue Pharma Settlement, THE HILL 
(Sept. 17, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/461664-holdouts-vow-to-challenge-purdue-pharma-
settlement. New York alleges that it discovered $1 billion of wire transfers from Purdue to Sackler 
family Swiss bank accounts just two days before the bankruptcy was announced. Id. 
 132. Id.; Christopher Rowland, OxyContin Settlement Snag: Arizona Objects to Stay of 




 133. See Mary Williams Walsh, Judge Orders Pause in Opioid Litigation Against Purdue 
Pharma and Sacklers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/health/
purdue-bankruptcy-opioids.html. 
 134. QuickFacts: Mariposa County, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,  
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/mariposacountycalifornia (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 135. California Opioid Dashboard, supra note 1 (click “County Dashboards”; then choose 
“Mariposa” from “Select County to view Dashboard” dropdown). 
 136. Brandi Cummings, 30 California Counties Sue Drugmakers for Opioid Crisis, KCRA 
(May 10, 2018, 12:05 AM), https://www.kcra.com/article/30-california-counties-sue-drugmakers-
for-opioid-crisis/20640984; Entities of the Negotiation Class, supra note 34 (click “Cities and 
Counties” hyperlink). 
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alleges 1) two claims for public nuisance;137 2) two claims under 
RICO;138 3) false advertising;139 4) negligent misrepresentation;140 5) 
fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation;141 and 6) unjust enrichment.142 
Mariposa seeks punitive damages under common law and California 
Civil Code section 3294.143 It also seeks abatement of the public 
nuisance, enjoinder from creating further nuisance, declaratory relief 
stating that defendants were in violation of the California False 
Advertising Act, enjoinder from further false advertising, restitution, 
actual damages, compensation for the costs of the epidemic, and civil 
penalties of $2,500 per each incident of false advertising, and 
attorney’s fees and costs.144 
The relief sought by Mariposa is by far the most broad-based. 
Mariposa seeks to “recover the costs of prevention efforts, treatment 
and services, as well as costs associated with jailing residents addicted 
to prescription painkillers and heroin.”145 Mariposa alleges it was 
harmed by being required to repair and retrofit “property related to 
police, emergency, health, prosecution, corrections and other 
services” and other governmental costs.146 It also alleges “specific and 
special injuries because its damages include, inter alia, injury to the 
property and systems of its health services, law enforcement, and 
medical examiner, as well as property costs related to opioid addiction 
treatment and overdose prevention.”147 The County seeks 
reimbursement for infrastructure costs related to increasing the 
number of jail beds, retrofitting and upgrading court, jail, medical 
 
 137. County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 121. 
 138. Id. at 135, 251. 
 139. Id. at 299 (in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500). 
 140. Id. at 302. 
 141. Id. at 306. 
 142. Id. at 308. 
 143. Id. at 311. 
 144. Mariposa lists such costs as: medical care and addiction care, treatment counseling and 
rehabilitation services, costs for “treatment of infants born with opioid-related medical conditions; 
. . . care for children whose parents suffer from opioid-related disability or incapacitation; and . . . 
costs associated with law enforcement and public safety relating to the opioid epidemic.” Id. at 
311–13. 
 145. Letter, Resolution Authorizing Participation in the California Counties Opioid Consortium 
and Approving Agts, from Steve Dahlem, Cnty. Couns. Interim Hum. Res. Dir., to Bd. of 
Supervisors 1 (May 1, 2018), https://www.mariposacounty.org/DocumentCenter/View/66935/Res
olution_2018-192?bidId= [hereinafter Letter Authorizing Participation in the California Opioid 
Consortium]. 
 146. County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 135. 
 147. Id. 
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examiner, hospital, and treatment facilities.148 It alleges causation 
through the defendants’ awareness of the likelihood of diversion and 
their failure to control it.149 Mariposa alleges public nuisance both on 
behalf of the County and, per the language of the statute, on behalf of 
all Californians.150 
Mariposa alleges with excellent specificity damages caused by 
the diversion of opioids. The complaint quantifies and details 
increases in pharmacy robberies, neonatal abstinence syndrome, 
fentanyl seizures, and ultimately opioid-related deaths.151 Mariposa 
also does an excellent job of pleading facts specific to their County, 
including opioid-related deaths, the increased rate of emergency 
department visits for opioid-overdoses, and the county-specific rate of 
opioid misuse and disorder.152 
When it comes to the problem of causation, Mariposa 
acknowledges a slightly more attenuated chain, but is able to draw a 
straight line between the defendants’ actions and damages to the 
county, stating, “Although not as direct as a car accident or a slip-and-
fall case, this causal chain is still a ‘direct sequence’ and a logical, 
substantial and foreseeable cause of the County’s injury.”153 Mariposa 
is represented by the county’s counsel and four plaintiffs’ firms, all of 
whom are representing other cities and counties in the Opioid MDL.154 
Mariposa’s complaint has the benefit of the plaintiffs’ firm’s expertise 
and no up-front costs to the county or tax payers. The claims here are 
pleaded specifically, tracking the claims of other Opioid MDL 
plaintiffs, yet take advantage of pertinent state law and specific 
damages to Mariposa. 
 
 148. Id. at 132. 
 149. Id. at 127–28. 
 150. Id. at 127–30. 
 151. Id. at 292–94, 296–98. 
 152. Id. at 294–95. 
 153. Id. at 296. 
 154. They refer to themselves as a “National Consortium” of plaintiff’s attorneys working on 
similar MDL claims. See Letter Authorizing Participation in the California Opioid Consortium, 
supra note 145 at 2. 
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a.  City of Los Angeles 
The City of Los Angeles (“the City”) alleges four claims: 1) 
public nuisance,155 2) RICO violations,156 3) negligence,157 and 4) 
negligent misrepresentation.158 The City of Los Angeles is a member 
of the negotiation class.159 Initially, the City did not make any claims 
against the Sackler family individually nor pharmacies, but the City 
filed a supplemental amendment in March 2019 and now names a total 
of thirty defendants.160 In a press release announcing the suit, the City 
Attorney said,  
“The scourge of prescription drug addiction has made a 
significant impact on Los Angeles residents and created a 
continued public nuisance in our City” . . . . “Manufacturers 
and distributors of these highly addictive and potentially fatal 
drugs must be held accountable for driving the opioid 
epidemic and the significant impacts of their reckless and 
irresponsible business practices.”161  
 The City seeks injunctions against defendants for 
maintaining the public nuisance, failing to report suspicious 
orders, “further false marketing and require[s] they take 
affirmative action to ameliorate the effects of their prior false 
marketing.”162 
The City is represented by the City Attorney and a San Francisco 
securities fraud and complex litigation firm.163 It is the only California 
plaintiff examined here that alleges negligence, and it does so based 
on both common law and statutory duties to comply with the 
California unfair competition law (UCL), false advertising statute, and 
 
 155. City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28, at 145; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479–3480 
(Deering 2020); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (Deering 2020). 
 156. City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28, at 146. 
 157. Id. at 157. 
 158. Id. at 159. 
 159. Entities of the Negotiation Class, supra note 34. 
 160. Short Form for Supplementing Complaint and Amending Defendants and Jury Demand at 
1, In Re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:18-op-45601-DAP (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2019), ECF 
No. 24 [hereinafter Short Form for Supplementing City of Los Angeles Complaint]. 
 161. City Attorney Mike Feuer Files Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturers, Distributors, L.A. 
CITY ATT’Y MIKE FEUER (May 3, 2018), https://www.lacityattorney.org/post/2018/05/03/city-
attorney-mike-feuer-files-lawsuit-against-opioid-manufacturers-
distributors?preview=true&site_id=312 (updated Nov. 13, 2018). 
 162. City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28, at 160. 
 163. Id. at 1; Consumer Cases, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, 
https://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases-consumer.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
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the California Health and Safety Code, as well as a duty to comply 
with the Controlled Substances Act, a federal law that regulates, 
among other things, how high-risk pharmaceuticals are distributed.164 
Equitable relief predominates the City’s prayer for relief, but it also 
seeks restitution, disgorgement of unjust enrichment, exemplary, and 
punitive damages. Probably due to the fact that most public health data 
on the issue are  more accessible at the county level, the City alleges 
specific facts related to Los Angeles County damages but not the 
impact of opioids on the City of Los Angeles.165 The only city-specific 
factual allegation is at least the most important metric: opioid-related 
death rates until 2015 averaged 2.5 per one hundred thousand persons, 
and 9.0 per one hundred thousand emergency room visits Angelenos 
were admitted to hospitals for an opioid overdose at about the same 
rate.166 The City’s theory of causation for public nuisance, RICO, and 
negligence rests on failure to report suspicious orders, whereas the 
negligent misrepresentation claim rests on causation by the affirmative 
concealment and omission of the risk of addiction.167  
The City’s pleadings represent a comprehensive effort to plead 
broadly against many kinds of defendants and to benefit from sharing 
and incorporating complicated claims like RICO along with other 
plaintiffs,168 while testing out lesser pleaded theories like negligence. 
c.  California State 
On June 3, 2019, California filed a complaint in Los Angeles 
County Superior Court against Purdue and the Sackler family alleging 
violations of: 1) California’s public nuisance statute,169 2) untrue or 
misleading representations,170 and the UCL.171 The State seeks 
permanent injunctions from false advertising and abatement of the 
public nuisance, civil penalties for each violation of the false 
 
 164. City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28, at 158. 
 165. Id. at 5–7. 
 166. Id. at 8. 
 167. Id. at 159. 
 168. Short Form for Supplementing City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 160, at 1–8. 
 169. State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 52; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479–3480 
(Deering 2020). 
 170. State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 50; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 
(Deering 2020). 
 171. State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 51; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. 
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advertising law and the UCL, and other equitable relief.172 California 
seeks, above all else, to hold the Sacklers accountable and to make an 
example of them.173 
California attempts to “take[] charge of any public nuisance, 
unfair competition law, and false advertising law claims brought on 
behalf of the People concerning the matters described herein.”174 
Seeking a friendlier jury at home and to maintain control of its own 
claims, the state has purposefully kept its claims out of the MDL and 
in state court.175 In a press conference announcing the lawsuit, 
Attorney General Xavier Becerra said,  
[T]he start of this crisis can be traced back to . . . Purdue 
Pharma and the Sackler family . . . . Purdue and the Sacklers 
traded the health and well-being of Californians for profit 
and created an unprecedented national public health crisis in 
the process, but we will hold them accountable.176  
The goals of the State seem to be just that, holding Purdue alone, 
and no other manufacturer, distributor, or pharmacy, accountable. 
About three weeks after California filed its complaint, Purdue 
filed for bankruptcy and the State subsequently amended its complaint 
to include eight other members of the Sackler family.177 
Confoundingly, the State does not allege claims against any other 
opioid manufacturers, distributors, or pharmacies—not even against 
defendants like distributor McKesson, California’s second-largest 
company after only Apple.178 Since 2017, McKesson has distributed 
more hydrocodone and oxycodone in California than any other 
 
 172. State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 54–55; Patrick McGreevy, California 
Joins Opioid Fight, Sues Purdue Pharma over Marketing of OxyContin, L.A. TIMES (June 3, 2019, 
11:41 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-oxycontin-maker-sued-by-california-
20190603-story.html. 
 173. Press Release, Attorney General Becerra Sues Opioid Manufacturer Purdue Pharma for 
Its Illegal Practices and Role in the Opioid Crisis, State of Cal. Dep’t of Just., Xavier Becerra, Att’y 
Gen. (June 3, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-sues-opioid-
manufacturer-purdue-pharma-its-illegal [hereinafter Becerra Press Release]. 
 174. State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 4–5. 
 175. Id. at 1. 
 176. ABC10, Xavier Becerra Announces Lawsuit Against Maker of Oxycontin at Opioid 
Summit, YOUTUBE (June 3, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lzeu6m9sDZc. 
 177. First Amended Complaint at 1, People v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19STCV19045 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2019) [hereinafter State of California First Amended Complaint]; Becerra Press 
Release, supra note 173. 
 178. Joe Mathews, It’s California’s Second Richest Company, but You Probably Haven’t 
Heard of It, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 11, 2018, 3:05 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/califo
rnia-forum/article194175574.html. 
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company.179 McKesson also generated $214 billion in revenue in 
2019, up 3 percent from the year prior—roughly $4 billion from opioid 
distribution alone.180 Further, McKesson is under investigation by the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for non-compliance with a 
2017 settlement with the Justice Department over alleged diversion of 
opioids in violation of the Controlled Substances Act.181 The 
settlement requires McKesson to report suspicious orders to the 
DEA.182 It is alleged that it failed to do so.183 
The State attempts to preempt state statutory violations from 
cities and counties in their own cases against Purdue. California 
appears to be experiencing a similar internal disagreement as other 
states over which claims can be alleged by local governments and 
which claims the state “owns.” Though less public than Ohio’s 
dispute, California attempts to assert control over all pending UCL and 
false advertising statutory claims against Purdue. As discussed below, 
case law does not support this exertion of power. 
i.  Home rule 
In its first amended complaint in People v. Purdue Pharma, the 
state wrote: 
Pursuant to his constitutional and statutory authority as chief 
law officer, including his responsibility to ensure that the 
laws are uniformly and adequately enforced, his supervision 
over District Attorneys and other law enforcement officers, 
and his authority to take charge of any investigation or 
prosecution over which the Superior Court has jurisdiction, 
the Attorney General, through the filing of this action, takes 
charge of any public nuisance, unfair competition law, and 
false advertising law claims brought on behalf of the People 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Brian Alexander, When a Company Is Making Money from the Opioid Crisis, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/09/opioid-crisis-
responsibility-profits/538938/; McKesson Reports Fiscal 2019 Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 
Results, MCKESSON (May 8, 2019), https://www.mckesson.com/about-mckesson/newsroom/ 
press-releases/2019/mckesson-reports-fiscal-2019-fourth-quarter-results/. 
 181. Stanton, supra note 67. 
 182. Id. McKesson did not donate to Becerra’s campaign for Attorney General, 
AmerisourceBergen, however, did. Rep. Xavier Becerra—California District 34: Political Action 
Committees (PACs) 2015–2016, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-
congress/pacs?cat=H04&catlong=Pharmaceuticals%2FHealth+Products&cid=N00009774&cycle
=2016&seclong=Health&sector=H (last visited Dec. 20, 2020). 
 183. Stanton, supra note 67. 
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concerning the matters described herein. This is the People’s 
operative complaint, and the people’s [sic] operative action, 
concerning those claims and matters.184 
While it is important to note that “those claims and matters” refer 
only to claims made against Purdue and the Sacklers and no other 
defendant, this has been the only sign of a home rule conflict between 
the state and the local governments. Even though California is 
attempting to assert control over claims made under the public 
nuisance statute, city attorneys, county counsel, and district attorneys 
have “concurrent” rights to bring public nuisance claims in the name 
of the people of the State of California.185 The statute actually says 
nothing about the Attorney General.186 Under a strict reading of the 
statute, the concurrent claims of Mariposa, the City of Los Angeles, 
and the State of California in theory can stand separately from one 
another, meaning that they may be able to recover independently. 
Recovery on a successful claim of public nuisance includes abatement 
and past damages.187 
The California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the California 
Constitution’s home rule provisions protects Mariposa and Los 
Angeles’s right to litigate such claims on their own behalves.188 It is 
still unclear whether both the Attorney General and a political 
subdivision may bring simultaneous claims on behalf of the People of 
California. Absent an express statutory provision, state preemption of 
these claims is unlikely: the statutes provide no express preemption 
language,189 and the state constitution has been construed broadly to 
give deference to cities and counties. “It has long been settled that, 
insofar as a charter city legislates with regard to municipal affairs, its 
charter prevails over general state law. . . . However, as to matters of 
statewide concern, charter cities remain subject to state law. . . . 
Similar rules apply to charter counties.”190 In fact, California’s public 
nuisance statutes seem to expressly permit local governments to 
 
 184. State of California First Amended Complaint, supra note 177, at 5–6. 
 185. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (Deering 2020). 
 186. See id. 
 187. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3484 (Deering 2020). 
 188. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 4–5. 
 189. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (Deering 2020). See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3494; Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Ct., 235 P.3d 21, 21 (Cal. 2010) (in which several cities and 
counties brought public nuisance action against manufacturers of lead paint). 
 190. Sonoma Cnty. Org. of Pub. Emps. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1979) (in 
bank). 
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pursue them on behalf of the state.191 When a similar issue arose in 
2014 when Orange and Santa Clara Counties brought UCL and false 
advertising claims against Purdue, Purdue removed to federal court 
but the district court remanded finding that because the action was 
brought on behalf of the People of the State of California (per the 
statute’s express authorization), no diversity existed.192 
Complicating matters further is the broad pleading of local 
governments like Los Angeles and Mariposa to include multiple 
defendants as opposed to California’s narrowly pleaded case against 
Purdue and the Sacklers alone.193 Purdue and the Sacklers are included 
in Los Angeles and Mariposa’s complaints, with both alleging public 
nuisance on behalf of their local communities and all Californians.194 
Additionally, Mariposa alleges violation of the California false 
advertising statute.195 The State’s attempt to co-opt those claims is 
likely to be unsuccessful, or at the very least, not worth the time to 
litigate. 
ii.  The State’s claims 
The State’s claims are the most narrowly pleaded of any 
California plaintiff. California alleges only three causes of action 
against Purdue and its owners. No common law causes of action are 
alleged, only statutory claims. 
While the State pleaded with great detail as to the general 
wrongdoing of Purdue and the Sacklers, it only alleged few facts 
specific to defendants’ impact on California.196 Establishing damages 
specific to California, and more critically, linking causation to those 
damages may prove difficult. 
 
 191. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 26528 (Deering 2020) provides, “The district attorney may, and 
when directed by the board of supervisors shall, bring a civil action in the name of the people of 
the State of California to abate a public nuisance in his county.” 
 192. California v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. SACV 14-1080-JSL (DFMx), 2014 WL 6065907, 
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014) (“Here, the FAC shows the Plaintiff is the People of the State of 
California. A state is not a citizen of itself and thus cannot be party to a diversity action. Fifty 
Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1970.) Therefore, looking to the face 
of the complaint, diversity jurisdiction does not appear to exist in this matter.”). 
 193. See City of Los Angeles Complaint, supra note 28. But see State of California Complaint, 
supra note 84. 
 194. County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 121; City of Los Angeles Complaint, 
supra note 28, at 145. 
 195. County of Mariposa Complaint, supra note 29, at 299. 
 196. See State of California Complaint, supra note 84, at 46–48 (facts related to Purdue’s 
California sales force and donations to California organizations supposedly friendly to opioids). 
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This narrative-heavy, but generalized form of pleading, combined 
with the State’s choice to only pursue claims against the single most 
notorious defendant in the opioid litigation may suggest that the State 
is more interested in the publicity associated with a high-profile trial 
than in seeking reimbursement of damages and abatement of the crisis. 
It is equally possible that the State would pursue this strategy to avoid 
recovering a judgment out from under its cities and counties or work 
behind the scenes to broker a global settlement. However, it seems that 
the State may not be factually equipped to handle trial on these claims 
and should aggressively seek settlement in Purdue’s bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
A look at the actual costs associated with the opioid epidemic in 
California provides the scale that a settlement or judgment would have 
to reach to effectively reimburse governments for damages. In 2018, 
the California State Treasurer’s Office estimated the total cost of the 
epidemic to the State at $4.3 billion.197 One study estimates that the 
cost of a single inpatient hospital stay related to opioid misuse is 
$6,671.198 The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse 
calculates that 19.5 percent of California’s state budget is spent coping 
with substance use and addiction, though only 2 percent of that is used 
for addiction treatment and recovery.199 Though the overall death toll 
from opioids in California is lower than other parts of the country, the 
economic cost is higher than any other state.200 Considering Purdue’s 
bankruptcy, it is unlikely that California will be able to recover all of 
its costs against Purdue alone. 
Moreover, the UCL earmarks how civil penalties from a 
judgment are used. The statute provides,  
If the action is brought by the Attorney General, one-half of 
the penalty collected shall be paid to the treasurer of the 
county in which the judgment was entered, and one-half to 
 
 197. Hale & DiSalvo, supra note 2. 
 198. Peter J. Mallow et al., Geographic Variation in Hospital Costs, Payments, and Length of 
Stay for Opioid-Related Hospital Visits in the USA, 11 J. PAIN RSCH. 3079, 3083–85 (2018). 
 199. Hale & DiSalvo, supra note 2. Plaintiffs are in the odd position that the more they spent 
on treatment and services, the better the case they have to prove damages. Poorer counties and cities 
who did not have the money to begin with might be at a disadvantage. 
 200. Id. California tops the list of opioid related expenditures by a landslide; the closest state is 
Texas, $2 billion behind. See also THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFF. OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 3–9 (2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/The%20Underestimated%20Cost
%20of%20the%20Opioid%20Crisis.pdf (attempting to quantify costs to the federal government). 
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the General Fund. . . . The aforementioned funds shall be for 
the exclusive use by the Attorney General, the district 
attorney, the county counsel, and the city attorney for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws.201  
Likewise, the false advertising statute earmarks civil penalties as 
one-half to the state and one-half to the county where the action was 
brought.202 Because of this predetermined statutory earmark, no 
judgment recovered under this statute could be used to reimburse the 
State for healthcare costs associated with the opioid epidemic, start 
new addiction recovery programs, or fund any other public health 
use.203 
Clearly, the opioid epidemic begs several questions of the 
American legal system. These questions bring into focus the 
limitations of the courts when it comes to class action, which local 
governments can sue on behalf of their citizens, and the meaning and 
scope of corporate accountability. Ultimately, only one question 
matters to the tens of thousands of people suffering from addiction or 
its second-hand consequences: can litigation provide relief? If so, what 
kind and if not, why bother? 
California cannot solve its opioid problem with litigation alone. 
But litigation can provide a path toward the best public health strategy 
local governments and states have: prevention. By seeking both 
remuneration for government funds spent fighting the opioid crisis and 
funds to abate the crisis, governments at all levels can create and fund 
long-term public health strategies that fit the unique needs of their 
individual communities. However, as past public health litigation 
demonstrates, these funds must be proactively protected from 
expenditure or reappropriation to non-public health expenditures 
through legislation, settlement terms, or ballot measures. 
C.  Past Public Health Litigation: Lessons from Big Tobacco 
While the opioid litigation stands to be the most impactful public 
health litigation ever, it is not the first of its kind. The most prominent 
and successful example of public health litigation to date is the state-
 
 201. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206 (Deering 2020). 
 202. See id. § 17536(c). “If the action is brought by the Attorney General, one-half of the 
penalty collected shall be paid to the treasurer of the county in which the judgment was entered, 
and one-half to the State Treasurer.” Id. 
 203. Id. 
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driven suits against tobacco companies for smoking-related harms in 
the 1990s. In that case, the parties agreed to a twenty-five-year $246 
billion Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that ended the decades-
long litigation.204 Most importantly, the MSA is a landmark not just 
for its size and scope, but because it was crafted with public health in 
mind.205 
1.  Tobacco Litigation Background 
Litigation against tobacco companies began in the 1950s.206 
These cases, usually brought by individuals, failed for forty-five 
years.207 Then, in the 1990s, the tide began to turn.208 By sharing 
resources and strategies from the few plaintiff victories through 
plaintiffs-only conferences and associations like the Tobacco Trial 
Lawyers Association, the Minnesota Tobacco Document Depository, 
and the Tobacco Control Resource Center at Northeastern University 
School of Law, plaintiffs’ attorneys were able to replicate and multiply 
the success of those early victories on a larger scale.209 State attorneys 
general led by Mike Moore of Mississippi quickly followed, and by 
1998 D.C., five U.S. Territories, and forty-six states, including 
California, had filed suit.210 
2.  California Plaintiffs in the Tobacco Litigation 
California, now a state that heavily regulates tobacco and has one 
of the highest tobacco sales taxes ($2.87 per pack), did not join the 
 
 204. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-01-851, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: STATES’ USE OF MASTER 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PAYMENTS 8 (2001), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/231942.pdf 
[hereinafter STATES’ USE OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS]; Nicolas Terry & Aila Hoss, Opioid 
Litigation Proceeds: Cautionary Tales from the Tobacco Settlement, HEALTH AFFS.: BLOG 
(May 23, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180517.992650/full/; W.E. 
Parmet & R.A. Daynard, The New Public Health Litigation, 21 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 437, 437 
(2000). 
 205. THE TOBACCO CONTROL RES. CTR., INC., AT NE. U. SCH. OF L., THE MULTISTATE 
MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF STATE AND LOCAL TOBACCO CONTROL 
17–18 (1999). 
 206. Kathleen Michon, Tobacco Litigation: History & Recent Developments, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/tobacco-litigation-history-and-development-
32202.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 207. Richard A. Daynard & Mark Gottlieb, Keys to Litigating Against Tobacco Companies, 
TRIAL, Nov. 1999, at 18. 
 208. Michon, supra note 206. 
 209. Daynard & Gottlieb, supra note 207, at 20. 
 210. Frank A. Sloan et al., States’ Allocations of Funds from the Tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement, 24 HEALTH AFFS. 220, 222 (2005); STATES’ USE OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS, supra 
note 204, at 12–13. 
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tobacco suits until June 12, 1997, late in the process.211 Eight days 
later, the companies and states announced that a global settlement 
agreement had been reached.212 Notably, the County of Los Angeles, 
the City and County of San Francisco, and the City of San Jose were 
the first and some of the only local government plaintiffs in the 
country to sue tobacco companies and did so well before the state got 
involved.213 As a result, they preserved local government interests in 
the settlement, and California split its settlement funds with all of its 
local governments—not just the three that sued—equally.214 
3.  Tobacco MSA Basics 
The MSA bound forty-six states, five territories, D.C., and the 
five largest tobacco companies who collectively owned over 99 
percent of the tobacco market.215 In exchange for dropping all claims, 
states receive annual payments from the companies totaling $246 
billion between 2000 and 2025.216 Major highlights of the agreement 
include: a moratorium on advertising targeting minors, regulating 
tobacco industry lobbying, reimbursement of states’ attorney’s fees, 
payments to both a smoking-prevention public education fund and 
national foundation, and opening internal industry records and 
research to the public.217 The agreement did not mandate how states 
spent their settlement money nor how states distributed settlement 
money to local governments if at all.218 The Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) recommends that 12 percent of settlement and tobacco 
sales tax money go to comprehensive state tobacco control 
programs.219 In 2014, only seven states were funding tobacco control 
 
 211. Inside the Tobacco Deal, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ 
settlement/timelines/fullindex.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Report, Task Force on Tobacco Litigation, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 575, 581 n.1 (1997); 
STATES’ USE OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS, supra note 204, at 13. 
 214. Sloan et al., supra note 210, at 222; STATES’ USE OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS, supra note 
204, at 13. 
 215. Joy Johnson Wilson, Summary of the Attorneys General Master Tobacco Settlement 
Agreement, AFI HEALTH COMM. (Mar. 1999), https://academic.udayton.edu/health/syllabi/tobacc
o/summary.htm#Statute. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Fast Facts and Fact Sheets, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/index.htm#:~:text=Smoking%20costs%2
0the%20United%20States,those%20funds%20on%20tobacco%20control (last reviewed Dec. 10, 
2020). 
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or smoking prevention programs at CDC-recommended levels or 
higher.220 In 2020, none was.221 
The MSA mandated that state legislatures pass a model statute 
requiring any tobacco companies who did not agree to settle “to 
require that such manufacturers establish a reserve fund to guarantee 
a source of compensation and to prevent such manufacturers from 
deriving large, short-term profits and then becoming judgment-proof 
before liability may arise.”222 States that did not pass the model statute 
faced a reduction in settlement payments.223 This ensured that the 
settlement was globally enforceable among defendants and even 
companies not named in the suit. 
4.  California’s Share of the MSA 
As of 2019, California has received a total of $16,550,051,823 in 
MSA payments.224 It has spent $250,400,000 (or 1.5 percent) on 
tobacco prevention efforts.225 California and New York, which 
account for the largest payouts from the MSA, are the only states that 
chose to split MSA money with local governments, in part due to the 
fact that cities and counties in both states filed their own suits 
alongside the attorneys general.226 In California, a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the state and local governments was executed 
in August of 1998, before the MSA was finalized.227 It governs the 
division of MSA funds between the state, cities, and counties.228 The 
state keeps 50% of MSA funds, the counties receive 45% apportioned 
by population, and 5% goes to the state’s four largest cities.229 Since 
then, the state, counties, and cities have sold off interest in future MSA 
payments by securitizing them and issuing high-risk bonds.230 
 
 220. Cezary Podkul & Yue Qiu, Tobacco Bonds May Be Dangerous to Your State’s Financial 
Health, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 7, 2014), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/tbcbonds-statemap. 
 221. State-by-State Tobacco Settlements 21 Years Later, supra note 39. 
 222. Wilson, supra note 215. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Payments to Date (as of April 18, 2019), Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. (2019) (on file with 
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). 
 225. State-by-State Tobacco Settlements 21 Years Later, supra note 39. 
 226. Podkul & Qiu, supra note 220; Sloan et al., supra note 210, at 222. 
 227. Memorandum of Understanding at 17–18, In re Tobacco Cases, No. JCCP 4041 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1998). 
 228. Id. at 12–14. 
 229. Id. at 12–13; Sloan et al., supra note 210, at 222. 
 230. Issue Brief, Tobacco Securitization Bond Issuance in California, Nova Edwards, Cal. 
Debt and Inv. Advisory Comm’n 2, 7–8, https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/reports/tobacco.pdf 
(11) 54.1_PANNIER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/21  2:46 PM 
2020] LITIGATING AN OPIOID EPIDEMIC IN CALIFORNIA 311 
Securitization and reappropriation of MSA funds are not 
uncommon. Though recent research has shown that public health 
prevention efforts yield a high return on investment,231 in the 1990s, 
many states secured their share of the tobacco MSA or put money into 
their general funds to patch up budget shortfalls.232 Even in states with 
the best laid plans, MSA funds have been subject to disagreements 
within statehouses regarding budgets and executive power, enabled by 
the fact that the terms of MSA do not bind states to use their funds 
exclusively for tobacco-related public health purposes.233 As one 
author wrote, “[t]he tragedy of the MSA is that it was a unique 
opportunity to build a sustainable tobacco control (or broader public 
health) infrastructure. With only 18% of the MSA revenues, every 
state could have funded its tobacco control program at CDC-
recommended levels, with no other funding needed.”234 A global 
settlement in the opioid litigation could provide similar public health 
research and crisis control funding for the epidemic but may only be 
effective if states do not appropriate funds to non-public health 
purposes. 
There is a few ways MSA funds have been protected, in some 
cases by voters. In 2000, just as the first settlements were paid out, 
Orange County voters approved Measure H, an initiative that 
earmarked the county’s share of the MSA funds to 12% tobacco 
prevention and control, 20% to the sheriff’s department, and the 
remaining 68% to other public health initiatives.235 Similarly, San Jose 
County voted to allocate their funds to a children’s health insurance 
 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Cal. Debt and Inv. Advisory Comm’n Issue Brief]; STATES’ 
USE OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS, supra note 204, at 9, 44–48; Podkul & Qiu, supra note 220. 
 231. Julia A. Dilley et al., Program, Policy, and Price Interventions for Tobacco Control: 
Quantifying the Return on Investment of a State Tobacco Control Program, 102 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH e22, e27 (2012) (finding that in Washington State for every dollar spent, the state saved 
five dollars in tobacco-related public health costs). 
 232. State-by-State Tobacco Settlements 21 Years Later, supra note 39; Berman, supra note 39, 
at 1038, 1041–46. 
 233. See Berman, supra note 39 at 1036, 1040–42. It stands to reason that MSA funds 
appropriately allocated to tobacco programming would be helpful in combatting the consequences 
of tobacco use that were unforeseeable at the time of the MSA like the rise in vaping-related 
respiratory illness. The same could be said for future issues yet unknown arising out of the opioid 
epidemic. 
 234. Berman, supra note 39, at 1058. 
 235. CNTY. OF ORANGE CAL., HEALTH CARE AGENCY, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS 
OUTCOMES REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010–2011, at 1,  
https://www.ochealthinfo.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=22537 (last visited Oct. 
4, 2020). 
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program.236 This is one method voters could use to protect any opioid 
settlement or judgment funds. Furthermore, it could work at all levels 
of government: state, county, and city. 
Paralleling the first few settlements in the tobacco litigation, some 
early settlements in the opioid litigation have been reached. Oklahoma 
prevailed at trial in state court against manufacturer Johnson & 
Johnson for over $400 million.237 Manufacturer Mallinckrodt is the 
first drug company to reach a global settlement with forty-seven states 
and territories for $1.6 billion.238 Concerns about how plaintiffs in 
these early cases plan to use their settlement and judgment money are 
growing.239 Lawmakers in states like Oklahoma are attempting to 
control the distribution of opioid settlement money away from 
research and treatment and directly into the state treasury where it 
could be used for any state expense.240 
As of 2018, Mariposa County received a total of $3.5 million 
from MSA payments.241 In fiscal year 2018–2019 the county received 
$193,157 in MSA payments242 and used it for after-school bussing, a 
Rural Media Arts Program, and the construction of four fire 
stations.243 As of 2018, the City of Los Angeles received a total of over 
$196 million from MSA payments.244 In fiscal year 2018–2019, the 
city received $10.9 million245 which was put into the city’s general 
fund.246 Since 1999, the state government has received over $8.2 
 
 236. Sloan et al., supra note 210, at 222. 
 237. Colin Dwyer & Jackie Fortier, Oklahoma Judge Shaves $107 Million Off Opioid Decision 
Against Johnson and Johnson, NPR (Nov. 15, 2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/15/7
79439374/oklahoma-judge-shaves-107-million-off-opioid-decision-against-johnson-johnson. 
 238. Sheila Kaplan & Jan Hoffman, Mallinckrodt Reaches $1.6 Billion Deal to Settle Opioid 
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/health/mallinckrodt-
opioid-settlement.html. 
 239. Sean Murphy, Concerns Arise About How Oklahoma’s Opioid Settlement Money Will Be 
Used, INS. J. (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.Insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2019/08/29/5
38343.htm. 
 240. Jackie Fortier, Here’s What Happened to $829M Oklahoma Was Awarded to Treat Opioid 
Addiction, PUB. RADIO TULSA (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.publicradiotulsa.org/post/heres-what-
happened-829m-oklahoma-was-awarded-treat-opioid-addiction. 
 241. Tobacco MSA Payments 1999–2020, supra note 39, at 19. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Mariposa County Budget, Final Budget Fiscal Year 2018–19, Cnty. of Mariposa 58, 
https://mariposacounty.org/DocumentCenter/View/70481/FY-18-19-Final-Adopted-Budget (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 244. Tobacco MSA Payments 1999–2020, supra note 39, at 19. 
 245. Id. 
 246. City of Los Angeles Budget, Budget Fiscal Year 2018–19, City of L.A. 16, 33 (May 25, 
2018). 
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billion in MSA payments.247 Even though the state legislature passed 
a bill limiting state expenditures of the MSA to “health purposes” 
including health care expansions like Medi-Cal, “education and 
outreach, including, but not limited to, efforts to help reduce the use 
of tobacco products. . . . [s]moking cessation services. . . . 
[e]nforcement of tobacco-related statutes. . . . [and] primary care and 
other state-funded clinics that serve low-income, uninsured, or 
underinsured Californians,”248 as of 2014, the state has only spent 8.9 
percent on smoking prevention.249 
The California Legislature also passed laws capping the amount 
of tobacco securitization bonds at $5 billion, but that was later 
repealed.250 As of 2009, the state had securitized 78.4 percent of its 
future MSA revenues through bonds.251 
The structure of the MSA is such that after the twenty-five-year 
payment period ends states will continue to receive smaller MSA 
payments in perpetuity tied to tobacco sales.252 The more sales, the 
higher the payments. Counterintuitively, states are encouraged to use 
the money from tobacco sales on public health programs to control 
and curtail tobacco use, thus reducing their payments from the settling 
companies over time.253 Unfortunately, the structure of the settlement 
actually disincentivizes local governments from controlling tobacco 
use in their communities because the MSA generates revenue. Many 
governments, especially small local ones, may in fact rely on MSA 
payments and sizable sales taxes on tobacco products to pay bond debt 
and to balance the budget. As one scholar wrote, “for public health, 
the size of any settlement may matter less than how the settlement is 
structured.”254 
III.  ANALYSIS 
While there are many lessons from tobacco plaintiffs’ decades-
long struggle, California plaintiffs should take heed of two. First, like 
 
 247. Tobacco MSA Payments 1999–2020, supra note 39, at 20. 
 248. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 104898 (Deering 2020). 
 249. Podkul & Qiu, supra note 220. 
 250. Cal. Debt and Inv. Advisory Comm’n Issue Brief, supra note 230, at 4. 
 251. Id. at 6. 
 252. Id. at 8. 
 253. See id. 
 254. Faith Khalik et al., Learning the Lessons of Tobacco: A Public Health Approach to the 
Opioid Settlements, HEALTH AFFS.: BLOG (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1
377/hblog20190925.554104/full/. 
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the California cities and counties that sued tobacco companies 
independently of the state, asserting claims now and maintaining 
control of them throughout litigation greatly increase the chance of 
maintaining control over a portion of any settlement or judgment. 
Second, unless states are bound by legislation, public initiative, 
referendum, or settlement terms, states will not use settlement or 
judgment funds for public health. Legislators at all levels of 
government cannot resist the temptation to use opioid funds to patch 
holes in budgets or on non-public health expenses.255 
On the whole, opioid plaintiffs seem to have learned the first 
lesson from the MSA. The sheer number and diversity of plaintiffs is 
evidence of this. Plaintiffs even formed a new class action tool called 
the negotiation class and for the most part have hired within the same 
small group of plaintiffs’ firms and tobacco litigation veterans to 
represent them on contingency. Both the negotiation class and 
plaintiffs’ firms have created a surprisingly unified front in the Opioid 
MDL while simultaneously exacerbating fractures between cities and 
counties and their state governments that were initially exposed by the 
tobacco litigation.256 In the tobacco litigation, the fault lines between 
different levels of government were never resolved. Now those 
divisions may hamper some plaintiffs’ bargaining power and make 
negotiation exceedingly difficult for defendants. If the MDL 
negotiation class is upheld on appeal, it may prove to be the major 
procedural legacy of the opioid litigation even as fractures between 
local and state governments grow deeper as a result. 
The second lesson is more important now than ever. While 
including public health spending mandates in any settlement 
agreement is the best option, short of that, plaintiffs, in consultation 
with public health agencies, can begin crafting statutes, resolutions, 
and memorandums of understanding for state legislatures and city and 
county councils with specific public health programs in mind. The 
 
 255. This temptation may prove increasingly difficult to overcome, as other public health 
emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic create widespread economic damage. See Jeannie 
Baumann & Jacquie Lee, Virus Pandemic, Opioid Epidemic Collide Around Social Distancing, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 7, 2020, 3:54 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-
sciences/virus-pandemic-opioid-epidemic-collide-around-social-distancing; Nicola Cantore et al., 
Coronavirus: The Economic Impact—10 July 2020, UNITED NATIONS INDUS. DEV. ORG. (July 10, 
2010), https://www.unido.org/stories/coronavirus-economic-impact-10-july-2020. 
 256. Jan Hoffman, States Clash with Cities over Potential Opioids Settlement Payouts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/health/opioids-litigation-
settlement.html. 
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benefits of starting this process early are many. First, with a plan 
already in place, treatment and recovery resources will enter the 
community faster. Second, legislation will ensure that absent 
amendment or repeal, funds are spent on opioid treatment and 
recovery in the long-term rather than diverted to other government 
expenses. Third, it avoids a potentially difficult initiative or 
referendum process. Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), ballot initiatives have become a widely used health policy 
tool.257 States not known for strong social safety nets nor robust public 
health funding have seen voters mandate the expansion of Medicaid 
under the ACA.258 Legislators at all levels of government have an 
opportunity to avoid a public fight about how to spend any opioid 
funds by beginning to plan now. Otherwise, California’s heavily used 
ballot measure process combined with public scrutiny surrounding the 
structure of early opioid settlements is a straightforward recipe for a 
ballot measure or initiative. For instance, San Jose’s children’s health 
insurance ballot measure and Orange County’s Measure H in 2000 
reserving county tobacco settlement funds to specific programs may 
be a useful template for public health interest groups and voters who 
want to use the initiative process to protect opioid funds for public 
health purposes. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
While many question the role of public health litigation in 
stopping and solving the opioid epidemic,259 it is clear that the opioid 
litigation, the most widely pleaded and argued public health litigation 
ever, is not just rewriting the rules of public health litigation, but those 
of multidistrict litigation and class action. For California, the state may 
not be aggressive enough in its pleading, particularly when one 
considers where the epidemic overlaps with other major issues of state 
 
 257. See Akeiisa Coleman et al., Medicaid Expansion Across the Country: A Check-In on 
Recent Ballot Initiatives, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.commonwe
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policy, like homelessness and the COVID-19 pandemic.260 All 
California plaintiffs are no doubt paying close attention to the second 
round of bellwethers, particularly City and County of San Francisco 
v. McKesson Corp. Because each test case alleges similar claims, City 
of San Francisco should prove to be an informative bellwether and 
provide useful information for settlement negotiation and trial strategy 
for all parties.261 All three plaintiffs should seek a lucrative settlement 
in lieu of trial, particularly the state, considering that pursuing its 
claims could entail a lengthy home rule fight, and a judgment may 
yield less money than a settlement. 
As a public health tool, settlement is much more effective than 
trial. Consider broadly the remedies available at trial: public 
accountability and disclosure. However, relief is limited to damages 
assessed by a judge or jury and some injunctive powers. On the other 
hand, settlement offers more flexibility to creatively craft public health 
prevention efforts in a way a jury or judge simply cannot. Pursuing 
settlement of the opioid litigation with public health and opioid use 
disorder and addiction prevention budget mandates remains the best 
chance many local governments have at recouping money lost in 
fighting the epidemic right now and investing in the public health 
prevention and treatment efforts that will stop it in the long term. 
Litigation cannot stop the opioid epidemic, but it can jumpstart the 
public health strategies and programs that will. 
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